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Abstract 
 
In 1781, the “States of Languedoc”, a French province, recruited at the University of 
Montpellier chemist Jean-Antoine Chaptal to develop the chemical industry in this region. 
The idea of using scientific and technological innovation to promote local economic 
development is not new. This idea has generated numerous policies since Chaptal. Some rely 
on the development of universities capable of training a skilled workforce and to provide 
scientific support to industry. Others give more purpose to promote the creation of new firms 
or the networking of existing ones. They do so in ways very different, from technology parks 
to policy of "clusters" funding projects that involve local collaborations. Finally, more 
recently, policies based on the theory of "creative class" have sought to attract not companies 
but persons whose profession is related to innovation activities, that they are technical, 
economic or cultural. This text present a review of these policies, from a series of studies 
conducted in France and Europe. The text will not seek to make a survey of public policies 
analysis, but rather to give a view based on some field studies. The effect of public policies 
can be of three types: non-existent, simple maintenance of existing balances, changes in these 
balances. With regard to the policies of local development based on innovation, if the first two 
kinds are widespread, the third is much rarer. This is partly because many policies are based 
on misconceptions about the mobility of firms and individuals (business parks, creative class), 
or the effect of simple spatial proximity of linking people or companies (effect "cafeteria" or 
"coffee machine"). The search for quick fixes, inexpensive and visible, favors policies which 
are usually ineffective. 
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Policies to promote local economic development are numerous, they are produced by various 
actors involving the same two issues: to ensure sustainable development, and to maintain or to 
increase jobs. Many rely on technological activities that are expected to be less sensitive to 
the effects of competition on the cost of labor and are thusly more promising. The range of 
policy instruments to encourage the growth of these activities is wide: building equipment for 
higher education and research, encouraging researchers of universities to collaborate with 
local companies, technology parks, incubators, “nurseries” for startups, programs supporting 
the creation of innovative companies, creation of venture capital funds, technological 
animation, aid to technology transfer, etc. For fifteen years, policies designed to attract 
persons believed to form a "creative class" have also been added: scientists, artists, 
entrepreneurs, renowned artisans, etc. 
 
Some of these policies are very old. For instance, a few years before the French Revolution 
the states of Languedoc province, created a university chair in chemistry to contribute to the 
development of a local chemical industry. This is one of the oldest known examples of 
science policy oriented towards local economic development. In fact, the chemist recruited, 
Jean-Antoine Chaptal, founded factories of soda, sulfuric acid, sulfate of iron and copper, 
employing more than 1500 workers circa 1785. Later, there were other examples of political 
rapprochement between higher education and industry, such as the creation of the 
Technischen Hochschulen in Germany, the Ecole Centrale des Arts and Manufactures in 
France, or, still in France, the creation of academic departments or facultés of science 
technical institutes between 1880 and 1914. Preceding the connection between academic 
science and industry, there were, of course, all the policies designed to implement universities 
or other higher education institutions in cities previously lacking them. The growing number 
of students and research activities allowed in many countries an increasing density of the 
university towns’ network. During periods of growth, a kind of competition develops between 
cities wishing to acquire higher education institutions, although the conditions of this 
competition vary greatly between countries and periods. However, expansion is a common 
feature of systems of higher education and research, we know very little of institutional 
closures. 
 
The direct link between research and industry has been systematically set out in the twentieth 
century policies, and has mostly been inspired by the arrangements put in place at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Etzkowitz, 2003). Indeed, it is here that the main 
concepts emerged: venture capital, technology transfer, technical consultancy, and even 
industrial zone hosting companies created from research. These ideas were implemented in 
the 1930s in California by Franck Terman, a graduate of MIT, director of the Department of 
Electrical Engineering of the Stanford University and founder of the Stanford Research Park, 
the starting point of the famous Silicon Valley. Discussions continue between specialists to 
decide the relative importance of this science park to the success of Silicon Valley, or the later 
arrival of the company founded by William Shockley (Nobel Prize in Physics for the 
development of the transistor) or the existence in the region of technical know-how. The issue 
in this debate is the priority given to causes which are "political" (the creation of the business 
park) “economic” (the location decision of Shockley) or “structural” (the existence of a 
skilled workforce). In any case, it is certain that the success of Silicon Valley has led to the 
creation of numerous technology parks in the world and to the proliferation of policies based 
on those that were put in place there. Initially, the building of technology parks was based on 
the idea that it was necessary to have facilities to accommodate companies from local 
academic research. Later emerged the idea that they could be factors for attracting foreign 
enterprises, and that the concentration of firms in a relatively small space should promote the 
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establishment of local partnerships. Some have thought that it was necessary to accompany 
this concentration by shared public spaces in order to encourage meetings. In many parks 
restaurants or cafeterias were built and expected to generate collaboration by what some park 
managers called the "cafeteria effect". A variant of this idea is to focus on the installation of a 
coffee machine in a building shared by several companies. More proactive policies offered 
direct services to start-ups: low cost facilities, commercial or legal advices, a joint secretariat. 
These shared and equipped spaces were called "nurseries" or "incubators". Park managers 
have also recruited people responsible for putting companies in contact with each other or 
with academic research laboratories. In addition to daily counseling, these people usually 
organize various activities: breakfasts, conferences, working groups on common themes 
(quality, free software, etc.). 
 
Finally, during the last fifteen years, "lighter" policies have been tried. Among these are 
incentives to network using competitive projects like German "clusters" of biotech or French 
“competitivity poles”. In this case, the local or national governments encourage companies 
and laboratories to compete in joint projects where the winners are awarded a label and public 
funding. Additionally, there were also some attempts to create favorable conditions for 
attracting people in so called "creative" occupations. In this second case, the local authorities 
conduct planning policies designed to develop neighborhoods that are supposed to be fitted to 
targeted social groups, developing cultural opportunities based on their tastes, and often 
providing direct financial incentives to encourage them to settle in their city. 
 
Today, all these policies coexist, and new ones are added to the pre-existing, rather than 
replacing them. They have been the subject of numerous studies from various theoretical 
frameworks, including economic geography, regional studies, management science, political 
science, sociology of organizations, innovation studies or science studies. 
 
My goal in this paper is not to make a survey of this enormous amount of work and adding 
another study to it. I wrote instead an essay on innovation policies based on my own research 
which for twenty five years has mostly focused on the case of France (especially provincial 
towns and more specifically the one where I live, Toulouse) as well as some research on 
several European countries I participated in. Therefore, this paper presents a personal 
perspective, based on my own empirical research, and some other studies, and not a classical 
academic paper with a complete survey of literature, and the exposal of one particular study. I 
apologize for this unusual format, and for using so much my own work, but I think it is the 
most suitable for a synthetic collection of texts like this handbook.  
 
I present in the first part the studies that I use as a basis for the essay. Some of them have been 
published in English, but some other have only been published in French. I summarize here 
the main studies and their results. In the second part of the text, I will present an analysis of 
the necessary conditions for the development of innovation activities based on local 
relationships between companies and academic research. This analysis will serve as the 
background for the ensuing evaluation of different types of policies listed. I will first examine 
policies oriented at higher education and research. Then I will focus on policies for 
enterprises, whether for attracting foreign companies or encouraging the creation of local 
businesses. Then I will turn to policies seeking to foster relationships between companies or 
laboratories of the same site. Finally, I will discuss the policies designed to attract "creative" 
workers. 
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1. Empirical basis of an essay on innovation policies. 
 
I would again like to apologize for the presentation of my previous work, but these studies are 
the main basis of the analysis to be presented in the following sections. These studies have 
been conducted from the perspective of economic sociology. It is close to the work of 
Harrison White, Mark Granovetter, AnnaLee Saxenian, Walter Powell, and other scholars 
who studied the embeddedness of economic activities in social structures (Di Maggio and 
Zukin, 1990). Some of these studies focus on a set of French cities, others on the whole of 
France, or a series of European cities. Their intersection is the city of Toulouse. I begin with a 
brief presentation of the industrial history of the city and an analysis of one of its industrial 
clusters. Then I shall focus on studies on the embeddedness of economic activities in social 
networks (relations between academic laboratories and firms, creation of innovative 
companies). Finally, I will present a study of the creative class in Europe. 
 
 
French scientific system, clusters in Toulouse 
 
Toulouse is an interesting case in the French innovation system. This city shares with 
Grenoble and Nancy the characteristic of having since a long time academic institutions 
specialized in engineering (Peyroux, Grossetti and Eckert, 2009). At the beginning of the 20th 
century, Toulouse was a sleepy regional metropolis (150,000 inhabitants) that had largely 
missed the Industrial Revolution. But the city developed soon a niche in higher education, 
research and high technologies due to a wide range of national policies as well as local 
impulses. Between 1906 and 1909, the Toulouse faculty of science, then headed by the future 
Nobel Prize Paul Sabatier, created three technical institutes: chemistry, electrical engineering, 
agronomy (Grossetti, 1995). The electrical engineering institute, the most successful, 
benefited from an important financing by the Toulouse municipality. In the 1930’s emerged a 
new specialization in chemical engineering and in fluid mechanics.  
 
After World War 2 emerged a new set of research institutions in automatics, system analysis 
and digital calculation, mostly because of the presence of the above mentioned technical 
institutes. Though, Toulouse was in the 1950’s still in search of economic development. The 
aeronautics industry that had emerged during the First World War (1917) under the leadership 
of a wagon manufacturer, Latécoère, enjoyed after WWII full support from the State as well 
as the interest of local officials. The combination of local lobbying and national policies was a 
key impulse to the fast development of this industry and related activities. The primary 
growth impulse was the transfer of several national Higher Engineering Schools in the fields 
of aeronautics in the 1960’s. The creation of an establishment of the National Centre for 
Spatial Studies, (CNES, 1961) draw locally a number of sub-contractors in computer sciences, 
and later on firms from space sector (Matra, Alcatel). Entrepreneurial logics also played a key 
role in economic development and specialization. The European aerospace complex 
developed around Airbus after 1974 became one of the main regional economic driving 
forces. Satellites manufacturing was the first industry in Toulouse to connect with the local 
research & higher education system during the 70’s, and the shifting of the aircraft industry 
from electromechanical technology to digital technology (Airbus A320 program) in the 80’s 
represented another major bifurcation. Another key impulse came from the establishment of a 
then state-owned computer company (CII) and of Motorola (a major manufacturer in 
electronics). The decentralization of the French meteorological institute in 1982 led to a 
growing demand for calculation infrastructures and services. The needs of local high-tech 
industry boosted the development of technological service firms (software engineering, 
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information storage, artificial intelligence, communication). Within a few years a ‘local 
competency system’ was born (Grossetti and Zuliani, 2011). This evolution was accompanied 
by the recruiting of a highly qualified workforce that had been predominantly educated within 
the local academic system.  
 
Toulouse also benefited of French policy of creating “competitiveness poles”. Jean-Marc 
Zuliani and I made a hundred of interviews between 2001 and 2006 with persons working in 
executive position in the firms or laboratories. Our analysis concludes that Toulouse « on-
board systems » cluster is by no way the result of the current policy “competitiveness poles”. 
It’s the contrary: the “competitiveness pole” is the result of a pre-existing socio-economic 
cluster. The policy reinforce the socio-economic cluster but without modifying its structure. 
In Toulouse's on-board systems cluster, private economic actors mainly use cluster policies as 
an opportunity to do the same thing that before with some additional money. Some actors 
(aerospace industry subcontractors) weakly connected with the cluster use the pole to better 
connect themselves to the whole local dynamics and networks already well structured. Some 
other actors (principals), which were weakly interconnected before, created more direct links 
and learn to work together for developing some specific technologies. Some firms (big 
subcontractors) are more involved in R&D activities. The sharing of knowledge is probably 
increasing and it’s certainly more formally organized. The convergence of technologies in 
different sectors is probably increasing. The main results of the new cluster policies had the 
effect of strengthening an already existing socio-economic cluster. That case is an example of 
the strengths and limits of cluster policies as revealed by an analysis of the practices of private 
economic and scientific actors: when they work, it’s often because they water already wet 
places. 
 
As in most cases, Toulouse’s industrial clusters are underpinned by social networks. The 
effect of these networks can be studied from collaborations between laboratories and 
companies or from the creation of new firms. 
 
 
Social networks in collaborations between academic research and firms1 
 
I worked with my co-author Marie-Pierre Bès on collaborations between firms and CNRS 
research laboratories within the “Engineering Sciences” department, where the public 
research has to prove also a mission in firms support (Grossetti and Bes, 2001). We analyzed 
more than a hundred collaborations, which at some time or the other were based on a contract. 
The method consists at first, in collecting information from a CNRS data base which lists all 
the contracts signed between the CNRS units and outside partner (about 14 000 contracts 
signed with firms between 1987 and 1998). We selected some researchers who were 
scientifically responsible for some of these contracts and we asked them to describe several 
collaboration experiences in order to collect some data on the genesis and on the evolution of 
the collaboration. Each story collected from one researcher was completed by interviews 
made with industrial partners or other participants (other researcher, doctorate financed in the 
frame of this collaboration, help given by employees from external organizations, colleague, 
and so on). We realized 27 initial interviews with researchers, which generated 130 stories, 
which themselves were completed with 119 interviews (73 with industrial partners, 46 with 
other researchers or participants). The researchers initially questioned belong to teams located 
in Toulouse (11), Bordeaux (5), Montpellier (3), Clermont-Ferrand (2) and Grenoble (6); most 
                                                 
1 This section and the next show in part a presentation given in a previous article (Grossetti, 2008). 
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of the SPI (sciences for Engineering) are represented: electrical engineering (1) electronics 
(7), automatics and robotics (3), computing (5), chemical engineering (4), fluid mechanics (7). 
The 130 relationships involve 81 partners, in which 38 major companies (73 relationships), 35 
small firms (38 relationships) and 8 are public organizations of technological research which 
we choose to include because they played the part of true industrial partners in the stories 
collected. 36% of these relationship are located in the same region (the research and the firm 
are located in the same region), 38% associate a provincial laboratory and a firm located in 
the Paris region and 26% a research laboratory and a partner from another region or country. 
 
We grouped the situations encountered into three categories, corresponding to the three 
figures displayed above. In the first category – network logic – the contact results from the 
existence of a pre-existing relation chain linking the people who made the decision to 
collaborate. This is the most frequent category (44% of cases). The decisive relation (the one 
that serves as bridge between the organizations) derive mainly – in four out of five cases – 
from teaching (former students, professor/student) or from professional activity (colleagues). 
It is mobility within local job markets that explains most of the local relations that we observe 
(Grossetti, 2007). People maintain links in the organizations they have passed through 
(university, companies) and these links can be mobilized in their professional activity. In the 
second category – the intervention of intermediary organizations – contact is established 
under the aegis of an external player who, willingly or otherwise, causes interactions between 
members of the organizations, which will then be led to collaborate. For example, a 
ministerial agency appointed one of the laboratory researchers and a member of the company 
to a limited group of experts who then decided to engage their respective organizations in 
cooperation. Or, again, a local organization seeking to promote exchanges between labs and 
companies intervened to put the two organizations in contact. This category is less common 
than the previous one (18%). Finally, in the third category – use of mediation resources – 
contact results from the partners’ initiative (based on public information, as for example 
scientific publications) or their meeting at a collective event (conference, trade show). Or the 
contact may be the result of the functioning of the student in-service training market: a student 
responds to a broadly distributed offer for in-service training, and the negotiations place the 
future partners in contact (the professor organizing the in-service training and the 
manufacturer taking in the trainee) who then decide to pursue their collaboration by other 
means. This third category accounts for 38% of cases. When we cross these meeting logics 
and the partners’ location, we get results that clearly lobby for explaining proximity effects by 
the existence of local personal networks. Although the correlation is clear, we need to be 
careful not to confuse local relations with the logic of networks, since the latter applies 
broadly to cases in which the partners are distant. Furthermore, these other two contact logics 
may also be involved in the genesis of local relations. One way to explain the correlation is to 
say that these relations favor local relations more than the other modes of bringing entities 
together, because the intermediary organizations are for the most part at the national level (in 
France’s case) and the mediation resources are not very local. Science-industry relations are 
therefore partly dependent – through personal relations – on other types of exchanges such as 
the teaching activities of researchers and the job market. 
 
However, there is a limit to the embedding of relations between organizations in personal 
networks.  In our data, the logics of contact between companies and laboratories do not appear 
to be correlated with the location of the laboratories studied, with the type of partners, with 
technological content, or with the duration of the collaboration. It is as if the partners’ 
geographic location were the main consequence of the context of formation of the 
collaboration in its unfolding. Overlooking the conditions of construction of the relation 
7 
 
involves processes that may produce “decoupling,” i.e., a weakening of the dependence on 
relations between organizations in relation to personal relations or, in contrast, a strengthening 
of this embedding. These well-known processes range from the formal legal framework 
constituted by the contract to the technical systems that allow joint work (prototyping, 
modelling, specific software, instruments, data produced, hardware, intermediate documents) 
and include the internal rules of organizations. In our analysis, we have stressed another 
process, “personification,” which is founded on the involvement of particular social actors 
who, for a time, embody the relation: trainees, co-funded doctoral candidates, researchers or 
on secondment. For a time, these actors belong to both groups. It might be said that they 
belong to the collaboration group and the project group associated with it. In more than nine 
out of ten cases, collaboration relies on the work of these intermediary actors. Like material 
intermediaries, human intermediaries contribute to making the relation partially independent 
of the groups involved. At the same time, to the extent that PhD students or trainees tend to 
get recruited by participating companies, and the engineers or researchers maintain relations 
with their old colleagues, this fourth process produces embedding in the social networks and 
may contribute to undoing the decoupling that resulted from the three preceding ones.  
 
Studying the relations between academic laboratories and firms gave us arguments against 
explaining proximity effects by the constraints of exchange of tacit knowledge. Indeed, we 
have never encountered a case in which engineers or members of the companies went 
regularly to the partner laboratories outside of the three or four annual project coordinating 
meetings, a frequency that practically never changes and in no way differentiates local 
relations from others. When cooperation requires major exchanges, which happens frequently 
but not systematically, there is generally a doctoral candidate who stays for successive 
periods, more or less long, in the laboratory and in the company. The technical constraints 
that may be involved in working at two sites distant from one another are easily compensated 
by methods like double prototyping (in electrical engineering, for example), in which a 
prototype identical to the system to be designed is created simultaneously at the laboratory 
and in the company. The idea that members of the company seek to appropriate the 
researchers’ knowledge, tacit or otherwise, no longer stands up to analysis.  What interests the 
companies questioned is the result and not necessarily the methods or concepts, but if that is 
the case, recruiting a doctoral candidate resolves this issue. However, that does not mean that 
there is no tacit dimension in these exchanges, but they in no way explain spatial proximity 
effects. Long-distance collaborative work is not especially difficult so long as certain 
participants are able to travel without a problem, and the technical and organizational set-ups 
are adapted to this situation. It might therefore be thought that the constraints of exchange of 
tacit knowledge do not explain the choices of location of companies resulting from research.  
 
 
Social networks in startups creation 
 
In another study, with Jean-François Barthe and other collaborators, we studied the creation of 
innovative companies (Grossetti and Barthe, 2008). We decided to consider the creation of a 
company as a complex process that involves many actors, and especially different levels of 
action. In this process, the founder or founders, considered as individual actors, give rise to a 
collective actor, an organization, by mobilizing resources and relying both on individuals and 
on existing organizations, sometimes in a more global milieu or an established market. We 
were especially interested in situations of access to resources. Mobilization of a resource is a 
sequence of actions in which one of the creators mobilizes or receives a resource he does not 
have. For example, consultation with an attorney to draw up the articles of association is a 
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sequence that involves one or more creators, the attorney, and the advice he dispenses. The 
attorney may be a relation of one of the creators, or a relation of a relation, in which case we 
consider that mobilization of the resource is achieved through social relations, or he may have 
been selected from a directory, in which case we consider that this is a mediating resource that 
allowed access to the resource. Hence, for example in case n°107, the sentence (made 
anonymous here) “The articles of association are drawn up voluntarily by an auditor whom 
[the creator] met while dancing” makes it possible to code that the resource is a counsel, that 
it was obtained through mobilization of a relation (by a relational chain of length 1), a relation 
established during leisure time. For the 53 companies we studied, the number of situations of 
resource mobilization averaged 16 per history (the minimum is 2 and the maximum 34), or 
870 in all.   
 
The first result is that social relations occupy a predominant place in the processes of 
company creation: 57% of the coded situations involve calling on relations. Relations are 
more present in the initial phase, before filing of the articles of association (64% of situations 
of access to resources involve relations). The following phases leave greater space to 
mediation resources (60% of access to resources through these mediations during the second 
year of existence), which illustrates the idea of a progressive decoupling of the new 
organization vis-à-vis the relations of its founders. It is as if the organization little by little 
succeeded in making itself independent of the founders’ relations, as if the initial embedding, 
essential to its creation, gradually weakened to the benefit of non-relational logics. The 
relations mobilized are above all professional ones (80% of cases), but quite often connoted 
affectively (36% of these relations are “friendly-professional”). The other modes of access to 
resources can be divided into two categories.  The first consists of professional or public 
bodies, which are the equivalent of the intermediary organizations seen in the study on 
relations between laboratories and companies. This mode of access to resources is present in 
27% of cases. The second category includes mediating systems, which may be media, various 
human mediators, seminars, trade shows or fairs. They represent 16% of cases. Social 
relations tend to favor access to local resources, just as intermediary organizations do, 
whereas mediation resources are slightly less oriented towards local resources. The result is 
close to the preceding study, but the intermediary bodies here are more local. The resources 
mobilized are overwhelmingly local. Customers are the only type of resource not primarily 
local in origin. 
 
Of the companies studied, some came out of academic research labs or used research results. 
The tacit-knowledge constraint does not appear here more than in the preceding study. In 
general, companies recruit young doctors coming out of laboratories in order to apply and 
develop technology, which resolves the problem of knowledge transfer. Location choices are 
therefore not closely linked to this constraint. Rather, they are explained by the initial location 
of the founders (whether the researcher or a collaborator): in general, people create companies 
where they live (and where their families live).  
 
Social networks that underpin industrial clusters are largely made up of people who have 
studied in local universities and schools. They have little to do with arrival in the city of 
creative professionals attracted by the quality of the urban environment. 
 
 
The mobility of creative workers 
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I was recently involved in a European study of the creative class (Martin-Brelot, Grossetti et 
alii, 2010). This research project entitled ‘Accommodating Creative Knowledge — 
Competitiveness of European Metropolitan Regions within the Enlarged Union’ (ACRE) was 
carried out within the Sixth Framework Program. The ACRE project includes several research 
steps, some of them based on quantitative data, others more on qualitative methods. This 
article is based on quantitative data deriving from a questionnaire survey that was carried out 
in 11 participating cities2 in 2007, and resulting in more than 2,300 questionnaires filled out 
by professionals considered to be ‘creative’. These empirical data provide a solid basis to test 
hypotheses on mobility of the creative class and the supposed role of ‘soft’ factors in 
attracting creative people (Florida, 2002).  
 
The majority of respondents in our survey were born or studied in the region where they 
currently live, which suggests that not only international but also long-distance national 
migration plays a subordinate role in their life. This can be explained by the strong 
embeddedness of European talent workers in the local labor markets through personal 
networks, or the particular functioning of the housing market in European countries, which 
may impede mobility. So, Florida’s theory doesn’t apply to the European context. The fact 
that Europeans are less mobile than North Americans is only the first possible answer. In 
addition, our results, combined with American criticism of Florida’s theory, also suggest 
another explanation: the theory has serious defects, at least regarding its geographical aspect. 
The theory relies heavily on a model of mobility where workers are not only liable to change 
location, but also make location choices in the same way that they choose a trip for a vacation 
week, comparing cities and their quality. This model does not take into account that workers 
are linked to particular people or to particular places where they have lived before. It also 
overestimates the importance of choosing a city when workers move to another job, and it 
underestimates the importance of choosing the neighborhood within an urban area. It may be 
less important to choose between Milan and Munich than between one district and another in 
Milan or in Munich. For creative people searching for a location, hard factors (mainly quality 
of jobs) are the reasons why they choose a particular city and soft factors determine why they 
choose a particular district. Florida’s model may work for single young professionals or 
bohemians looking for inspiration or a quick career move and ready to take off at any moment 
if they see a better chance. But it does not seem to apply to families with children of school 
age, for whom the prospect of living with another language and a novel cultural environment 
may be a serious obstacle. It may also not work for middle-aged couples, where one of the 
partners is professionally connected with a particular European area or where adjusting to 
other pension regulations would have to be seriously considered. 
 
I now use these studies, and some others, to propose a reflection on policies meant to facilitate 
local economic development based on innovation activities. 
 
 
2. What are the conditions necessary to develop and innovate using local 
scientific - industrial relationships? 
 
Of course, innovations are not necessarily based on relationships between science-industry 
and when this is the case, these relationships are not necessarily local. Numerous technical 
innovations have emerged without links to scientific research or even to higher education, 
from weaving looms of the first industrial revolution to the recent microchips. When 
innovations take place at the interface of two worlds, they can be done by remote 
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collaborations, neither do they imply the existence of local "clusters"2. If I am interested in 
innovation activities based on local relationships between companies and academic 
organizations, it is because they are subject to numerous policies - those that I listed in the 
introduction - and in this paper I 'm interested on the effects of these policies. I use the term 
"innovation activities" to sidestep the difficulty involved in assessing the level of innovation 
in a recently developed product or service, when lacking the necessary historical perspective. 
If we consider that innovation is a product or service that has found a new market, it may take 
time and it is impossible for an analyst to comment on the short term. In contrast, we can 
easily identify "industrial worlds" that are organized around the production of technical 
innovations, for example in the field of digital technologies or that of biotechnologies. This 
means that companies rely on technological innovation to make a profit and that significant 
activity is oriented towards the production of such innovations. If "innovation activities" as 
defined here do not produce real innovations, we can assume that they could not continue in 
the long term, even if the government support or investment from large industrial groups can 
maintain them for some time. 
 
What are the necessary conditions that make an innovative industrial cluster involving local 
scientific and industrial relationships possible?  
 
The first is local industry, whether coming from institutions created by outside companies or 
from the creation of new local companies. Therefore the first ingredient is an analytical 
process stemming from their industrial history. In most industrial clusters, it is rare to have 
settlements of outside companies. Moreover, moving sales offices or facilities of service 
companies headquartered elsewhere to seek benefit from the market created by the economic 
dynamism of the cluster can be detected. The basis of the cluster generally consists of firms 
created locally, whether they be old and or have experienced changes in their business and the 
technology they use. When this is not the case, there is a strong political incentive, as was the 
case in France for the business park of Sophia-Antipolis, which benefited from national 
policies that encouraged some public research organizations and firms to settle there. Of 
course, there are firms, or industrial groups, which are likely to settle in cities that compete to 
attract them, but it is relatively rare compared to the movement for the creation of local firms. 
 
The second necessary condition is the presence of institutions of higher education and 
research. While in some countries like the United States or Germany, there has always been a 
decentralized network of universities, many other countries have a much more hierarchical 
network whose density increased over time. In this context, obtaining the creation of a 
university, an institution of higher education or a research organization, is naturally an 
important issue. Analyzing such settlements and developments is the realm of scientific, 
institutional historians. If a city has both enterprises and institutions of higher education, local 
research initiatives must still be compatible. Industrial sectors and scientific specialties may 
not always be so, creating additional problems. An obvious, but relevant reminder is that 
connections are more easily established between a department of electronic engineering and 
the same industrial sector than that between a department of mathematics and basic 
manufacturing companies in paper pulp.  
 
Therefore two historical processes converge at once. I want to make two statements on these 
processes: 1) in some cases, industrial history and the history of scientific institutions can 
                                                 
2 I use here for convenience the term "cluster" proposed by Michael Porter (1990) to describe spatial 
concentrations of firms and other organizations in interaction that were called before "districts", "local industrial 
systems", or sometimes "technopoles". 
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be totally separate; 2) various industrial or scientific processes can lead to similar 
results. The first assertion can be supported by examples in which a scientific institution has 
grown into a town in the total absence of stimuli coming from the local industry, for example 
as a result of a policy, like in the case of engineering in Toulouse between 1900 and 1980 
(Peyroux et al, 2010). And we could present similar examples of industrial processes. The 
second assertion is based on the observation that the similarity of current industrial systems 
may still have very different histories. I had the opportunity to compare the industrial history 
of Toulouse and Grenoble and I found that while the former city has benefited from 
significant national and local policies to create separate industrial and scientific basis, that 
have later established collaborations, the latter saw these collaborations develop very quickly, 
and its industrial and scientific system developed interactively. There is no single historical 
path towards the formation of innovation clusters. They are the result of a history of structural 
logic, policies, industrial strategies and contingencies. 
 
Let’s suppose that a city is equipped with an industry and a scientific system which is 
compatible, it is still necessary to establish mutual exchange. So called "proximity effects", 
are involved here, that is to say that when "all non geographical things that we have designed 
to measure are made equal", there are more local relationships (on the scale of urban areas) 
than should be. I would like to add three assertions about the effects of proximity. The third 
assertion is that proximity effects are independent of the historical processes of 
constitution of the concentration of companies and scientific institutions. Of course, they 
can reinforce them, interact with them, but it is by no means a necessity. They must be studied 
separately from these historical processes. The fourth assertion is that these effects are due 
mainly to the embedding of exchanges between organizations in networks of 
interpersonal relationships. This is a classical theory since the work of Granovetter (1985) 
and, in the case of clusters of innovation, the study of AnnaLee Saxenian on Silicon Valley 
and Route 128 (1994). It is also true in France (Grossetti, 2008) and in most contexts where 
these effects have been investigated through field work. The embedding logic explains the 
main part of the effects of proximity, but they can also have other causes, such as public 
facilities. Simply put, in all cases studied, the embedding logic prevails, whether combined or 
not with other factors. Constraints on the exchange of tacit knowledge, which were sometimes 
referred to by scholars to explain the effects of proximity in science-industry relationships 
(Zucker et al, 2002) do not seem so important: most often industry does not seek to 
appropriate knowledge to researchers, but rather their results. In the rare cases where they 
need to acquire this knowledge, firms can recruit researchers, possibly temporarily, or send 
their own researchers to collaborating university laboratories, without locating the company 
near the laboratory. 
 
Finally, the fifth assertion is that proximity effects are spread mainly across the urban 
area and not on the scale of technological parks and smaller spaces. This assertion is 
consistent with what is known about the geography of personal networks, most of which tend 
to concentrate in urban areas, although some may continue strong ties despite the distance. 
And from the links listed in the town inhabited by respondents, relations from the same 
neighborhood are the minority. This does not mean that there is no specific effect related to 
proximity at the level of the neighborhood, the block or the building. But these effects are 
much lower than those in the same city; that is broadly speaking, at less than an hour of low 
cost transport. In the case where parks are inserted into an urban area, in general, a particular 
densification of network collaborations across parks is not observed, once the effects of 
industrial or scientific specialization are neutralized. When we empirically study the genesis 
of collaborations between companies or between companies and laboratories, there is no 
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empirical case where collaboration is born from a meeting in a cafeteria or in front of a coffee 
machine between people who not previously know each other. In our study of scientific-
industrial collaborations conducted in France in 2000 (see above), Marie-Pierre Bes and I did 
not observe random meetings in a public place. This result is consistent with the studies on 
social interaction (Goffman, 1967) which show that being in the same public space does not 
necessarily produce interaction: in general, taking the subway with other people will not 
generate interaction with these people, except at the subway’s failure or other rare 
occurrences. 
 
This summary outlines what is to me a set of results obtained on specialized innovative 
clusters, even if not all of them are unanimously cited by researchers working in this area, 
particularly regarding the explanation of proximity effects. Stating these results outlines 
elements for policy evaluation in the future creation or development of these clusters, but I 
will look more systematically at the policies. 
 
 
3. Assessing the effectiveness of local policies to promote innovation 
 
I introduced above a kind of typology of these policies, some of which are very old (although 
still in circulation) while others are much more recent. I'll start with the oldest, those on 
higher education and research. 
 
 
3.1. Policies on higher education and research 
 
The history of recruiting Chaptal by the states of Languedoc in 1781, which I mentioned in 
the introduction, can be interpreted as an effort by local authorities to guide an existing 
university to its’ industrial applications. It may seem that this type of policy has been quite 
common in history, but by looking more closely at these cases, we realize that this is rarely an 
initiated by local authorities, rather it is the outcome of lobbying by some application-oriented 
scientists who are seeking resources for their research. For example, when considering the 
establishment science departments in technical institutes in France between 1880 and 1914, 
we realize that, even when these institutes have industrial or public funding, it is always the 
teachers who instigate their creation (Paul, 1980). These policies can have significant effects 
even when developed by those who are the direct beneficiaries. It can be argued that 
Grenoble, Nancy and Toulouse’s sustainable orientation of their respective science 
departments towards engineering originated with the creation of electrical institutes, which 
then resulted in a significant over-representation of this type of higher education institution 
and laboratory in the current scientific make up of these cities (Grossetti, 1995). In some cases 
the orientation has been accompanied by industrial development based on the same types of 
skills (Grenoble), while in other cases, the enlarged engineering degree programs and research 
found no echo in the local industry over many decades (Toulouse). 
 
For this type of policy to be established, it is necessary that cities have universities and this is 
not always the case. Another policy is therefore simply to obtain the creation of a university. 
In some of the historical and national contexts, such as France, the cities do not have the right 
to establish universities. Their representatives therefore rely on lobbying for favorable 
government decisions. Thus, in the French system for the period 1808-1870, academic 
departments, faculties were created by government decision. The faculty of science were rare 
at the beginning of that period, and have seen their numbers increase over the different waves 
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of creation. Each time, fierce competition has pitted cities that are geographically close 
(Rennes and Nantes, Nancy and Metz, etc.) against each other to obtain new schools. More 
recently, in the 1960s and 1990s, during two periods of French higher education expansion, 
cities with no university have influenced the "scientific map" by funding "antennas" of 
universities based nearby, with the long term objective to obtain the government funding for 
these antennas to becoming comprehensive universities In other national contexts (Portugal, 
1990-2010), it is possible to establish private universities without having to obtain the consent 
of the government. Cities can then intervene more directly, by stimulating and supporting 
private initiatives. Having a university is always an advantage for a city because it secures a 
younger population pursuing university studies and maintains or increases a mass of local 
consumers. It also allows local businesses to have a skilled workforce and exchanges with 
scientists. But not all universities are in a position to contribute to the emergence of 
specialized, innovative clusters, rare is the case, as it requires the presence of companies 
likely to connect with high level university research.  
 
A variant of this kind of policy is the one that aims to establish a government research center. 
In the French case, the choice of location outside Paris, such institutions (nuclear research 
center in Grenoble, space agency in Toulouse, telecommunications development center in 
Lannion in Brittany) were the result of lobbying by representatives of the cities, enabling their 
networks in government. The effects of these institutional creations were varied. In the case of 
Lannion and Toulouse, these effects are important because the establishments were both 
industrial operators as well as technical development centers. In Lannion, this implementation 
has generated an entire industry of telecommunications. In Toulouse, the space center has 
become the basis of a cluster of industrial space activities, including a research laboratories 
and training in electronic engineering and computer science that were already in place, thus 
initiating economic development based on engineering activities. 
 
 
3.2. Policies on industrial development 
 
To strengthen local industry, one can try to encourage the installation of outside companies or 
to create institutions supporting the creation of local businesses. In general, local governments 
are trying to combine the two aspects. 
 
To attract outside companies, cities often rely on the creation of amenities such as business 
parks and technology infrastructure, thought to be sought out by companies. The idea is to 
attract companies looking for a place to set up by arranging the space for it. This is somewhat 
reminiscent of the famous cargo cult that the Melanesians developed. In this myth, which 
includes many variants, cargo is wealth that came by means of ships or planes. For 
Melanesians, whites did not work, they could only get these riches sent by their ancestors 
through magic. Thus, the Melanesian began to build mock docks, radios and runways, to 
attract Cargo (Worsley, 1957). Somewhat the same way, the myth of the attraction of 
companies assume that simply putting in place the necessary conditions (business services, 
industrial areas, local roads and communication) is sufficient for making companies settle 
there. Certainly, it is necessary to accommodate businesses and provide them with the 
resources they need to operate, but this approach often forgets the real logic of setting up a 
business location. First, new locations involve few companies and virtually all cities are in 
competition with each other, further, most of them (in the same country) have comparable 
assets. Then, in general, a company does not choose its location because local amenities or 
because tax exemptions (except in the case of very large groups of institutions searching for a 
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location across the country or continent). The choice of location comes from more traditional 
economic factors (proximity to markets or resources), and in some cases from  subjective 
factors, more complex than just tax benefits and existing infrastructure (e.g. geographical 
origin and social networks of leaders, especially for small and medium enterprises). In France, 
some implementations of large companies (in Sophia Antipolis or Toulouse for some 
companies) are the result of political lobbying and the activation of social networks much 
more than an examination of the costs and benefits. When a technological park fills up (this is 
the case in France for Grenoble or Toulouse parks for example), it is mainly by companies 
already established in the same city. 
 
To promote the creation of local businesses, local governments generally create support 
services, business incubators, and sometimes venture capital organizations. In a study on the 
creation of innovative companies in various French cities, we could verify that these 
structures are actually used by local entrepreneurs (Grossetti and Barthe, 2008). Two thirds of 
entrepreneurs used the support services for start-ups at least once, for legal and business 
advice. Many are welcomed in a nursery or in an incubator, but it is mainly to have 
inexpensive accommodation. Finally, the local venture capital organizations are often 
involved, but they only support a limited number of projects, which explains why 
entrepreneurs are often critical of them. It seems that this type of policy is a little less random 
than looking for outside locations by the development of technology parks.  
 
 
3.3. Policies to foster relationships between firms or companies and laboratories 
 
Technology parks are also expected to promote local exchanges, providing meeting 
opportunities to companies or laboratories. They are often accompanied by mediation 
activities organized by people who are specialized in these areas and who are paid by local 
authorities. 
 
If we summarize the achievements of the empirical studies mentioned in the first part, we can 
emphasize two points. 1) The business parks do not produce "synergies" ... Regarding 
parks located in large cities, the results contradict the idea that they are sources of synergies: 
local social networks are not built on the basis of this closeness, but mainly through the 
participation of members of companies or laboratories for routine activities (studies, work, 
etc..) that are spread over a wider area. In large cities with high rates of technological 
activities, parks are filled because they meet certain business needs (accessibility, working 
comfort, image, etc.) but are not the source of local exchanges between productive 
organizations or scientists. We did not observe either a "cafeteria effect" or any "coffee 
machine effect" in connecting people who are not already connected. In a sense, the city itself 
is enough a "park" to cause proximity effects. Moreover, by encouraging employees to reside 
in the periphery, technology parks contribute to urban sprawl and social segregation (some 
nearby municipalities become "white collars ghettos"). 2) ... but human mediators do 
produce some. In the study of collaborations between laboratories and companies mentioned 
above, we found several cases in which contact was initiated by a person whose function it 
was to facilitate these exchanges, (a local representative of the national agency for innovation, 
a university administrator that specializes in personal links with business, a local government 
service person responsible for communication with companies etc.). Some activities (working 
groups on technical standards, for example) have also led to collaborations. These actions can 
be effective across a metropolitan area and are in no way dependent (if not a political choice 
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for local authorities) of the concentration of scientific and industrial establishments in a 
technology park. 
 
 
3.4. Policies oriented towards attraction of “creative” workers 
 
For regional economist Richard Florida, a "creative class" exists in our societies: it groups 
together those who, in today's economy, develop new ideas, technologies and creative content 
(Florida 2002). This class covers a wide variety of occupations, he cites among others, high-
tech business, entertainment, journalism, finance, or crafts. Florida also adds a theory of 
economic development of cities by attracting creative class members to the concept of the 
creative class. According to this author, the members of the creative class choose the cities in 
which they will settle on the basis of qualities such as urban environment, openness to 
minorities or the vitality of cultural activities, thus “soft” urban factors, rather than traditional 
“hard” factors such as employment, wages, or infrastructure. 
 
In the world of urban policies technicians and local elected officials, the attraction of these 
"creative" professionals has emerged as the solution for urban development policies as it is 
inexpensive and successful in the short term: it may seem easier to attract persons than whole 
companies, or, more costly, to foster endogenous development by financially supporting 
education and research. This thesis has prompted policies to attract a small elite scientific, 
cultural or business, through direct incentives, or facilities expected to match the tastes of this 
social stratum. In a study of the "creative" professionals in 12 European countries (Martin-
Brelot et al., 2010), we showed that these professionals are relatively non-mobile, a majority 
of them were born or have studied in the town concerned. Those who settle in a city they have 
not previously lived in come most often employment and salary concerns. Cases that 
correspond to the theory of attracting creative by "soft factors" represent less than 1% of 
interviewees. Similar results were obtained in surveys in the United States (Scott, 2006). In 
fact, the problem is somewhat similar to the attraction of business: geographic mobility is too 
low for allowing this type of policy being effective. However, it seems that what we can keep 
from the creative class thesis is the idea that urban environmental factors are important, in 
attracting students for temporary stays, and also in retaining “creative” professionals that 
might seek to escape an unfavorable environment. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Policies fostering innovation may be on quite varied scales of time and space. Some focus on 
very limited areas (technology parks) supposed to promote innovation through concentration, 
others focus on the urban level, others go beyond (county, region). Some policies are short-
term (developing an activity area, advertising for the site), others medium term (implementing 
operations, creating structures of venture capital), others in the long term (development of 
teaching and research institutions). 
 
The examples that I have shown suggest that urban areas are the most relevant geographical 
scope. This is the scope of deployment of "spontaneous" cooperation, networks, and labor 
market. Further, this is the level at which most proximity effects occur as they are lower either 
below or above (excepting the nationwide level). In terms of time frame, the results are more 
complex. The longer-term policies, including those relating to education and research, are 
often the most effective, although some shorter-term policies may be useful in a more 
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restricted way. In particular, such is the case with human mediators or coordinators whose 
actions are well integrated in the local networks of research and industry. Infrastructure such 
as technology parks may not be very useful, overall it seems humans are more effective than 
concrete… … 
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